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HOW JUDGES VIEW CIVIL JURIES
Paula L. Hannaford, B. Michael Dann, & G. Thomas Munsterman*
The adage "where you stand depends on where you sit" is never
truer than in opinions about civil juries. The public and most trial
participants form their opinions based on the ultimate outcome of the
trial-the jury's verdict. Certainly this is true of the litigants who tend
to view the civil jury in the starkly black-and-white terms of win or
lose, liability or no liability. Lawyers sometimes have a more objec-
tive view of the jury based on their greater knowledge of trial proce-
dures and greater familiarity with the vagaries of civil trials generally.
Nevertheless, few lawyers will proceed to trial without at least an
outside chance of persuading the jury of the rightness of their posi-
tion. It is understandable, therefore, that many attorneys view
favorable verdicts as proof of the strength of their evidence and pres-
entation skills, while they view unfavorable verdicts as proof of the
irrationality of juries.'
The trial judge would appear to be the person most capable of
forming an informed and objective opinion about the value of civil
juries. In addition to extensive knowledge of trial procedures gener-
ally, his or her involvement in pretrial conferences and evidentiary
hearings increases the likelihood that the trial judge is familiar with
the specifics of the case and the idiosyncrasies of the lawyers and their
clients. Through their experience on the bench and prior legal experi-
* Paula L. Hannaford is a staff attorney and Senior Research Analyst at the National Center
for State Courts in Williamsburg, Virginia. Honorable B. Michael Dann is a judge for the Supe-
rior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, in Phoenix, Arizona. G. Thomas Munsterman is the
Director of the Center for Jury Studies at the National Center for State Courts in Arlington,
Virginia.
1. Compare, for example, editorials in legal periodicals about the verdict in McDonald's
spilled coffee case, in which the jury awarded the plaintiff $2.9 million in compensatory and
punitive damages (later reduced to $480,000). See, e.g., William A. Allison, Cold Facts About
Case of Spilled Coffee, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 27, 1994, at 6 ("If you and I know all the facts,
there are very few jury verdicts in this country that we wouldn't agree with."); Michael S. Fro-
man, Spilled and Burned: Not Open and Shut, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Oct. 13, 1994, at 6 ("It is
really just another example of how a jury trial can shift, bend and take unexpected turns.").
Empirical research also demonstrates that lawyers' assessments of jury comprehension and
performance are strongly related to whether or not the verdict was favorable. Paula L. Hanna-
ford et al., Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform 32 (1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the National Center for State Courts).
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ence, judges often develop keen insights about how juries are likely to
perceive trial evidence and witness testimony. Finally, the trial judge
is less likely to become caught up in the partisan concerns of the liti-
gants and their respective attorneys and consequently is in the best
position to determine whether the jury's verdict is correct based on
the evidence and applicable law.
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to confuse the judge's impartiality be-
tween the parties with objectivity toward the jury. Judges necessarily
must view the jury in relation to themselves and their own role in the
process of litigation. This is not simply a matter of whether the judge
agrees or disagrees with the jury's verdict, but also how the judge per-
ceives the jury's decision making process. How seriously do jurors
undertake their duties? Are they able to set aside their preconceived
ideas and biases? Do they understand the evidence and applicable
law? The judge evaluates all of these factors against the backdrop of
his or her own involvement in the management of the case (e.g., pre-
trial conferences, evidentiary hearings, discovery disputes, settlement
negotiations) and the case's relative significance among the hundreds
of other cases that make up the judge's caseload.
In any given case, therefore, the judge's view of the jury may mani-
fest itself as a complex and subtle mixture of respect, gratitude, con-
cern, pride, impatience, and even frustration. But more revealing
than what judges say about juries is what judges do to prepare jurors
for their roles in civil cases. This paper explores the various indicators
of judges' views of the civil jury, including the social and institutional
factors and contemporary jury reform efforts that affect judges' views
about the civil jury.
I. WHAT JUDGES SAY ABOUT CIVIL JURIES-
DIRECT DETERMINANTS
As a preliminary matter, judges do not generally share the reserva-
tions so often expressed by attorneys, litigants, and the public about
the general competence of the civil jury. In a 1987 survey of state and
federal judges, over three-quarters of the respondents indicated that
the right to trial by jury in routine civil cases is an essential safeguard
which must be retained.2 Survey respondents demonstrated less confi-
dence in civil juries in complex cases, but the majority nevertheless
rejected a suggestion to limit the use of juries for cases involving
2. Louis HARRIS & Assocs., JUDGES' OPINIONS ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES: A SURVEY OF
STATE AND FEDERAL TRIAL JUDGES WHO SPEND AT LEAST HALF THEIR TIME ON GENERAL
CIVIL CASES 79-80 (1987).
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highly technical and scientific issues and complicated business cases.3
As a practical matter, such cases are the exception, not the rule, of
civil trial dockets. 4
Much of this confidence stems, no doubt, from the traditionally high
level of judge-jury agreement on verdicts. In their classic study of the
American jury, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel reported that 78% of
judges in civil cases would have decided the case the same as the jury.5
More recent studies confirm that the incidence of judge-jury agree-
ment remains high.6 In a 1991 survey of Georgia judges, 87% of the
respondents indicated that their experience in civil negligence cases
was substantially the same as the Kalven and Zeisel respondents while
another 10% reported even higher levels of judge-jury agreement.7 A
1998 evaluation of jury reform initiatives in Arizona revealed an 84%
judge-jury agreement among judges indicating their preferences in
civil verdicts.8
Of course, agreement on the verdict is only one of the many factors
that can affect a judge's confidence in the ability of a civil jury to ar-
rive at a correct verdict. Based on questions submitted during the trial
and deliberations and post-verdict initerviews with jurors, judges have
a unique opportunity to assess the jury's performance. Most judges
give their civil juries high marks for their process of decision making
as well as the verdicts. In the Arizona study, the judges' average" rat-
ing for the reasonableness of juror questions was 5.8 on a scale of 1
(very unreasonable) to 7 (very reasonable). 9 The Harris study re-
ported that over 98% of state and federal judges believe that jurors
usually make a serious effort to apply the law as they are instructed.10
Eighty percent of the federal respondents and 69% of the state re-
spondents disagreed with the statement that jurors' feelings about the
3. Id. at 83-84.
4. In a 1992 study of civil cases in 75 state courts, automobile and premises liability cases-
which typically involve relatively uncomplicated factual and legal issues-accounted for nearly
half of all jury trials. Carol J. DeFrances et al., Civil Jury Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REP. (U.S. Dept. of Just., Washington, D.C.), July 1995, at 1, 1.
Medical malpractice, products liability and toxic substance tort, and business contract disputes
accounted for approximately 20% of all jury trials. Id. at 2.
5. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63-64 (1966).
6. See R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26
GA. L. REV. 85, 98-99 (1991).
7. Id.
8. Based on preliminary data collected in connection with a National Center for State Courts
project entitled Should Jurors Be Permitted to Discuss the Evidence Prior to Deliberation?,
funded by the State Justice Institute No. SJI-96-12A-B-181 [hereinafter Juror Discussions
Project].
9. Id.
10. Louis HARRIS & Assocs., supra note 2, at 79-80.
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parties often cause them to make inappropriate decisions.1' Over
two-thirds of the respondents disagreed that jurors too often fail to
apply the law because of comprehension problems. 12 The Georgia
study echoed these findings. 13 Seventy-nine percent of the survey re-
spondents rejected the suggestion that bias in favor of a party was the
reason for judge-jury disagreement and 92% rejected jury miscom-
prehension as the reason for the disagreement. 14
Judges' confidence in the judgment of civil juries can only be as-
sessed relative to their confidence in other methods of arriving at the
same outcome-generally either by settlement among the parties
themselves or through a bench trial. Since the first of these alterna-
tives precludes the need for a trial altogether, this option shall be dis-
regarded for the time being. When asked about the relative difficulty
of bench and jury trials, many judges report that bench trials require
far more concentration and effort on the part of the trial judge.' 5 In-
deed, it is through experience with bench trials that many judges first
come to appreciate the value of the civil jury.
For trial judges, the difficulty associated with bench trials, and the
relative benefit of jury trials, is both quantitative and qualitative. First
is the purely cumulative burden of juggling the many aspects of the
trial. In addition to procedural and evidentiary matters, the judge is
typically responsible for routine administrative matters including man-
aging court staff assigned to the trial (e.g., clerk, reporter, bailiff) and,
all too frequently, managing the interpersonal conflicts of the trial at-
torneys and their clients. Responsibility for other cases on the judge's
docket supplements concerns about the immediate trial. During trial
recesses, for example, the judge may be hearing motions in other
cases, writing decisions for cases previously adjudicated, hearing
emergency petitions on other matters, scheduling new cases, holding
pretrial conferences for upcoming trials, accepting settlements, and at-
tending to post-verdict administrative matters.1 6 Delegating the "fact-
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Sentell, supra note 6, at 17.
14. Id.
15. Based on anecdotal reports from trial judges during the authors' collective 50+ years
working with and in courts.
16. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE (1972); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES, THE
JUDGE'S BOOK (1989).
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finding" task to the jury relieves the judge of a substantial amount of
work.17
These responsibilities are separate from the qualitative tasks of un-
derstanding and evaluating the evidence and testimony and rendering
a substantive decision in the case. The fact-finder's undivided atten-
tion is needed not only for adequately understanding the evidence
presented at trial, but also for making the very difficult decisions
about the parties' competing claims. The evaluation of witness credi-
bility, for example, is wholly within the province of the fact-finder-as
most jury instructions make explicitly clear.18 Even more difficult are
highly subjective decisions, particularly those involving damage
awards, for which judges have no special claim of authority or exper-
tise. 19 Assigning a monetary value on pain and suffering, or the worth
of a life in a wrongful death case, are precisely the decisions that many
judges believe are best made by the collective judgement of a jury.20
Judges who have struggled with these types of decisions in bench
trials develop tremendous respect for the civil jury and rarely take its
role for granted.21 The personal benefits to the judge of the jury's
participation are, in fact, the flip side of the coin of the political and
institutional benefits that make up the traditional justifications for the
civil jury. The allocation of decision making between the judge and
jury injects "community values" into the judicial process while shield-
ing the judge from criticism for unpopular decisions and insulating the
whole justice system from allegations of elitism, judicial bias, and
political influence.
In spite of the tremendous impact of the American jury system, the
view of jury service as "citizenship at its best" is generally not taught
beyond the secondary school level-and often not taught well, even
17. To be sure, judges in bench trials must ensure that the parties have satisfied their burden
of proof with respect to sufficiency of the evidence. This, however, is far easier than deciding the
relative weight of the evidence or credibility of witnesses.
18. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUcrIONS, Civil 2.20 (Paul G. Breckenridge, Jr. ed., 8th
ed. 1994) ("You are the sole and exclusive judges of the believability of the witnesses and the
weight to be given the testimony of each witness.").
19. Id. 14.13.
No definite standard is prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable compensation for
pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount of such
reasonable compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering you shall exercise
your.., judgment and the damages you fix shall be just and reasonable in the light of
the evidence.
Id.
20. See generally Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1408, 1432-41
(1997) (advocating the usefulness of the civil jury as a decision making body in a democracy).
21. Based on authors' collective experience.
1998]
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then.22 The most eloquent commentary on the institution of trial by
jury is generally found only in the dicta of appellate court opinions,23
and consequently is not widely read by the American public. Indeed,
even those individuals who are reasonably well informed about the
American justice system often overlook this aspect of jury service,
mainly because their involvement as attorneys or litigants is generally
characterized by partisan bias.
Recognition of the inherent limitations of the judicial role may be
part of the maturation process for judges-something that cannot be
acquired through legal education or practice, but only develops
through long experience on the bench. This experience is not entirely
unique to judges, however. In some sense, serving is believing. Indi-
vidual jurors typically emerge from their jury experience with new re-
gard and appreciation for the justice system and their own role in it.24
But their involvement in the judicial process is generally too fleeting,
and their numbers too few, to translate this view into widespread pub-
lic support for civil juries.25
22. Although schools and formal education were listed as the principal sources of information
about state and local courts by 24% of respondents to a national survey of public perceptions
about the courts, YANKELOVICH, SKELLY & WHITE, INC., THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF COURTS: HIGH-
LIGHTS OF A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC, JUDGES, LAWYERS AND COMMUNITY
LEADERS 12 tbl.1.13 (1978), respondents' actual knowledge of courts was very low. Id. at 1-2; see
Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury: Can Reality Be Found in the Illusions?, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 231-34 (1999) (describing literature on public misinformation about the
civil justice system).
23. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
[Jury service] "affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a pro-
cess of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for law." Indeed,
with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is
their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.
Id. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
24. For an overview of studies on juror reactions to jury service, see Shari Seidman Diamond,
What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve As Jurors, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). Anecdotally, judges and
lawyers who have served as jurors generally emerge with a new appreciation for the institution
of trial by jury and often with a commitment making jury service a more "juror friendly" experi-
ence. See infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
25. The National Center for State Courts estimates that 10% of the adult American popula-
tion is summoned for jury service each year. The estimate is based on the following: Approxi-
mately 150,000 jury trials take place in the U.S. each year, for which approximately 1.5 million
persons are needed to serve (based on average 10 persons per jury). The current estimated U.S.
population is 270 million, of which approximately 180 million (2/3) are age 18 or older. Percent
of population serving = 1.5 million / 180 million = 0.8%. The preferred size of the pool of pro-
spective jurors is three times the number of jurors needed; 3 x 1.5 million = 4.5 million. To
summon 4.5 million jurors, courts issue approximately 18 million summonses with the expecta-
tion that approximately 1/4 of the persons summoned will be qualified and available to serve
(avg. juror yield). Percent of population issued summonses = 18 million / 180 million = 10%.
HOW JUDGES VIEW CIVIL JURIES
II. WHAT JUDGES THINK ABOUT CIVIL JURIES-
INDIRECT DETERMINANTS
The process and outcome of a civil jury trial is not the only-or
even necessarily the most critical-determinant of how judges view
the civil jury. Their views of the whole civil justice system and their
own roles within that system are equally as important. Judges are,
after all, involved to one degree or another in the whole process of
civil litigation from the filing of the initial pleading to the final disposi-
tion of the case. The actual jury trial itself represents only a small
portion of the total amount of time, effort, and expense involved in
resolving the case.26 Less than 6% of all civil cases filed are resolved
by trial, and less than one-third of those are tried to a jury.27
Although many judges claim that civil jury trials are "the best of a bad
job,"28 it should not be surprising that concerns about other aspects of
the civil justice system such as public criticism can overshadow judicial
enthusiasm for civil juries.
Judges have not been unaware or unconcerned about public dissat-
isfaction with various aspects of civil litigation. The most frequent
complaints focus primarily on two problems. First, high levels of pro-
cedural complexity create expense and delay for litigants. 29 Second,
the gamesmanship associated with the adversary system obstructs the
fact-finding process and hinders dispute resolution. 30 To address these
concerns, courts began implementing administrative and procedural
reforms designed to streamline case processing and facilitate
settlements.3'
The types of reforms were many and varied, but a common thread
in most of them was greater involvement and control by the trial judge
in every phase of civil litigation. For example, the unified court move-
After jury qualification and jury selection for specific trials, however, less than 1% of the adult
American population actually serve.
26. In a study of civil jury trials in the country's 75 largest county courts, the median number
of days from the beginning of trial to the verdict averaged four days while the total time to
disposition (filing to verdict) was 751 days. John A. Goerdt et al., Civil Jury Trials and Awards,
19 ST. CT. J. 23, 35 (1995).
27. DeFrances et al., supra note 4, at 2.
28. Private communication from a civil trial judge attending the National Judicial College,
Reno, Nevada, to G. Thomas Munsterman.
29. See generally ABA ACTION COMM'N TO REDUCE COURT COSTS & DELAY, ATTACKING
LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY (1984) (describing caseload and management studies and recom-
mendations to improve case processing).
30. See generally Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profes-
sion, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85, 90-92 (1994) (discussing a lack of professionalism, procedural
exaggerations, and other "Rambo Tactics" that are bringing increased disrepute and dissatisfac-
tion to lawyers and the legal field).
31. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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ment had as an objective the dissolution of limited jurisdiction courts
and the creation of a single level of general jurisdiction trial courts.32
From a case processing perspective, this arrangement granted judges
the authority to decide any and all legal issues that were presented at
trial. The elimination of multiple case transfers and appeals de novo
to higher level trial courts saved time and expense for litigants.
Similarly, the rise of judicial administration and court management
as specialized professions within the judicial arena legitimized
caseload management techniques. 33 For the first time, courts could
evaluate their trial dockets and assign cases with an eye for improving
disposition and clearance rates and using judicial resources as effi-
ciently and effectively as possible.34 More importantly, this careful
evaluation of caseloads revealed for the first time the extent of non-
trial resolution of civil cases. Paradoxically, the civil justice system
was devised to plan for, manage, and carry out an event-a civil
trial-that very rarely occurred. As much as 95% of all civil cases
were settled, dismissed, or decided by default or summary judgment.35
As courts became aware that non-trial resolutions to civil cases
tended to decrease the "filing to disposition" time and increase docket
clearance rates, judges were encouraged to become more proactive in
their approach to caseload management. The establishment of firm
trial dates, greater involvement in pretrial conferences, settlement ne-
gotiations, and alternative dispute resolution programs became in-
creasingly popular techniques. 36 This was a sea change in the
expected role of the civil trial judge that could not help but affect how
judges viewed civil jury trials.37
32. See generally LARRY BERKSON & SUSAN CARBON, COURT UNIFICATION: HISTORY, POLI-
TICS AND IMPLEMENTATION (1978) (evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of court unification
in light of the experience of 11 states).
33. ROBERT W. TOBIN, AN OVERVIEW OF COURT ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES
15-24 (1997).
34. Id.
35. DeFrances et al., supra note 4, at 2.
36. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN PRETRIAL CASE PROCESSING (Dis-
putes Processing Research Program Working Paper No. 1981-2, 1981); E. Donald Elliott, Mana-
gerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 322-26 (1986); Ernest C.
Friesen, The Trial Management Conference, JUDGES' J., Fall 1990, at 4, 4-7, 42-44; Marc Galanter,
The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257, 261-62 (1986);
Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage
Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 254 (1985);
Jaime Pieras, Jr., Judicial Economy and Efficiency Through the Initial Scheduling Conference:
The Method, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 943, 943-44 (1986); Hubert L. Will et al., The Role of the Judge
in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203, 203 (1976).
37. The use of these techniques was not uniformly accepted by civil trial court judges, and
much less so by the legal community generally. For critical commentary, see Daisy Hurst Floyd,
[Vol. 48:247
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Consider, for a moment, some of the implications of these funda-
mental changes in the judge's role in civil litigation. Judges, particu-
larly those using an individual calendaring system, became much more
familiar with the details of the civil cases on their dockets than previ-
ously. 38 Factual and legal issues likely to arise at trial now are typi-
cally raised on numerous occasions during discovery, 39 and most
certainly during pretrial conferences. 40 After two or more years of
case management-a normal time frame for civil litigation 41-the
judge may be just plain tired of the case, particularly if rancor between
the parties has required substantial judicial intervention during dis-
covery.42 Moreover, if the judge has taken an active part in decisions
on discovery motions concerning, for example, the relevance or ad-
missibility of witness testimony, he or she may have already formed a
fairly well informed opinion on the merits of the parties' competing
arguments.
Juries, of course, do not have the advantage of months or years to
become familiar with the various factual issues implicated in the
case.43 The combined task of maneuvering through an unfamiliar ju-
dicial system, absorbing new information (often consisting of complex
scientific, technical, or financial evidence and testimony), and apply-
ing legal standards (many of them counter-intuitive) to the facts is
understandably difficult for many jurors. This difficulty, however,
may be met with little sympathy and indeed some level of impatience
Can the Judge Do That?-The Need for a Clearer Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45
(1994) and Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
38. See, e.g., PAUL S. LYNESS, MOVING FROM THE MASTER CALENDAR SYSTEM TO THE INDI-
VIDUAL ASSESSMENT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DIs-
TRICT OF NEW YORK: A COMPARATIVE REPORT 29-32 (1997).
39. Id.
40. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and corresponding state civil procedure
rules encourage judges to become involved in pretrial case management. FED. R. Civ. P. 16
advisory committee's notes.
[Rule 16] has been extensively rewritten and expanded to meet the challenges of mod-
em litigation. Empirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes personally at
an early stage to assume judicial control over a case and to schedule dates for comple-
tion by the parties of the principal pretrial steps, the case is disposed of by settlement or
trial more efficiently and with less cost and delay than when the parties are left to their
own devices.
Id. Many state and local civil procedure rules echo these sentiments. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. Civ. P.
16; DEL. SUPER. CT. CiV. R. 16; IOWA R. CIv. P. 136; MD. R. CIV. P. (CIR. CT.) 2-504.2; TENN. R.
Civ. P. 16.03; Wis. STAT. § 802.10 (1994).
41. DeFrances et al., supra note 4, at 10.
42. Cases that ultimately go to trial typically involve the most difficult legal and factual issues,
the least skilled lawyers, and the most recalcitrant parties.
43. Indeed, prospective jurors are struck from the jury panel during voir dire if they indicate
any personal knowledge about the case or the parties. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL
JUDGES, supra note 16, at 127-28.
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and frustration from judges who have dealt with the case and the par-
ties over a substantial period of time.
There is yet another implication to having judges more actively in-
volved in pretrial efforts to settle civil cases-judges' reaction to the
need for a jury trial given their efforts to help settle the case. Increas-
ingly, judicial productivity is measured by the total number of cases
resolved, as compared to the total number of trials presided over.44
The incentive, therefore, is to get cases resolved as expeditiously as
possible. Viewed in this light, a jury trial is the least desirable out-
come and a poor reflection on the judge as "case manager" or "dis-
pute resolver."
III. WHAT JUDGES Do ABOUT CIVIL JURIES
Judicial views of the civil jury-both positive and negative-ulti-
mately have little effect on the continuation of jury trials as a method
of dispute resolution in civil litigation. As vehemently as some judges
defend the civil jury system, there is no denying that it is a human-
and thus imperfect-system. Some juries fail to understand the im-
port of evidence and testimony presented at trial, particularly in com-
plex cases.45 Juries routinely struggle with jury instructions on the
applicable law, often misunderstanding legal concepts that are critical
to the correct application of the governing law to the facts. 46 On ex-
tremely rare occasions, some juries even engage in misconduct, such
as consulting external sources to arrive at their verdicts or basing their
decision on bias toward or against a party in deliberate disregard for
the facts and the law. 47 At some point in every civil jury trial, the trial
judge must make a transition from thinking about the jury as an ab-
stract ideal to thinking about the jury as a specific collection of lay
persons who have little or no accurate knowledge of the American
justice system and who are fully capable of fallibility in this specific
case.
44. See TRIAL COURT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS WITH COMMENTARY §§ 2.1-2.3 (Bureau of
Justice Assistance 1997).
45. See generally VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 113-29 (1986) (not-
ing that problems of juror competence may impede jurors from following instructions and cor-
rectly applying the law as intended).
46. Numerous studies document the difficulty jurors face in comprehending jury instructions.
See, e.g., Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or In Light of It?, 1
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977); Michael J. Saks, Judicial Nullification, 68 IND. L.J. 1281 (1993);
Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Com-
municate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77 (1988).
47. Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 2673, 2730-39 (1996).
[Vol. 48:247
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By the same token, as much as some judges distrust the jury's ability
to render fair and just verdicts, some cases just resist resolution by any
other means. The facts are sufficiently disputed to survive a motion
for summary judgment, the weight of the evidence is so close that ca-
pitulation on the merits by either party is unlikely, or the stakes of
winning or losing are too great for the parties to settle. In some cases,
sheer human stubbornness on the part of the parties and lawyers may
make them unreasonable and incapable of settling their differences.
Unless the parties and lawyers opt for a bench trial-permitting the
judge to decide the case formally during trial rather than assist the
parties informally during pretrial-the civil jury will become a reality
in due time, regardless of the judge's views about its efficacy.
In response to many of the conflicting views of the civil jury, various
civil jury reforms have been promoted across the country.48 The spe-
cific problems that these reforms purport to address, however, reflect
the idiosyncratic views of their respective supporters.49 For judges
who distrust civil juries, appropriate reforms are designed to place re-
strictions on jury decision making discretion-or at least to minimize
the potential damage caused by "erroneous" jury verdicts.50 In con-
trast, those judges who generally approve of the civil jury tend to sup-
port reforms aimed at improving the jury's comprehension and
competence as decision makers, thus decreasing the need to overturn
the jury's verdict or adjust the jury's award.51 But there are subtle
differences even among the latter type of reforms. Some reforms, for
example, are designed to help jurors reach their verdicts through a
decision making process that resembles that used by judges.52 Others
attempt to structure the trial process in a "jury friendly" manner that
permits jurors to utilize their natural learning and decision making
skills to arrive at an appropriate verdict.53 As discussed below, the
reform initiatives that ultimately dominate the jury reform agenda in
any given jurisdiction will reflect judges' views of the civil jury.54
Moreover, all of the approaches raise questions about the judge-jury
48. See generally NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas
Munsterman et al. eds., 1997) (describing contemporary jury reform techniques).
49. See infra notes 57-85 and accompanying text.
50. G. Thomas Munsterman & Paula L. Hannaford, Reshaping the Bedrock of Democracy:
American Jury Reform During the Last 30 Years, JUDGES' J., Fall 1997, at 5, 8-9.
51. See infra Part III.A.
52. See infra Part III.B.
53. See infra Part III.C.
54. See infra Parts III.A to III.C.
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relationship and the role of the jury in the American civil justice
system.55
A. Constraints on the Civil Jury
Rhetoric favoring wholesale abandonment of the civil jury is popu-
lar with some commentators, but the odds that such a drastic measure
would ever be implemented are slim to none-almost certainly none
in those jurisdictions that elect their trial court judges. 56 The more
common approach has been to place constraints on the power of the
civil jury, ostensibly to limit the potential damage from erroneous ver-
dicts or excessive damages. 57 Most of these constraints are legislative
creations enacted under the general rubric of tort reform.58 For exam-
ple, proposals for statutory caps on damage awards and restrictions on
the availability of punitive damages have been enacted in several ju-
risdictions.59 Such measures are in addition to traditional judicial
remedies of remittitur and additur to adjust jury awards that are exces-
sive or inadequate as a matter of law.60 Some attorneys have also
developed the practice of "high-low agreements" in which the parties
(with or without the knowledge or consent of the trial judge) agree
that a reasonable damage award would fall within a specified dollar
range.61 If the jury's award falls within the range, the parties accept it
as given. 62 If the jury's award falls above or below that range, how-
ever, the parties agree to the highest or lowest amount on the range,
respectively.63 Such agreements reduce the perceived level of uncer-
tainty associated with jury trials.
55. See infra Parts III.A. to III.C.
56. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), was
the closest that courts have come to abolishing the civil jury on their own initiative. In that case,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that due process precludes the Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury when the factual and legal issues to be decided would exceed the jury's
ability to decide a case with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and law. Id. at 1084-86.
But see In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431-32 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
there is no "complexity" exception to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial).
57. Munsterman & Hannaford, supra note 50, at 8-9.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a01 (1997) (limiting compensatory damages for pain
and suffering to a maximum of $250,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1997) (limiting
punitive damages to a maximum of $350,000); Id. § 8.01-581.15 (limiting compensatory damages
in medical malpractice cases to $1 million).
60. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1.
61. For descriptions of this technique, see Kevin G. Faley & Andrea M. Alonso, High-Low
Agreements: Misunderstood Litigation Technique, 219 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1998), available in LEXIS,
Legnew Library, NYLAWJ File.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Whether implemented as a legislative, judicial, or contractual ar-
rangement, the sentiment underlying these approaches is the same:
civil juries are untrustworthy and their power to decide liability and
impose damage awards on litigants should be sharply curtailed. The
ultimate effect of these approaches is to transform the civil jury into
an advisory body whose judgments may be accepted if they are
deemed "reasonable" by some external standard, but otherwise can
be disregarded in favor of a more palatable result.
B. Helping Juries Think Like Judges
In contrast to reform initiatives that place constraints on the jury's
verdict, some initiatives attempt to guide the jury's decision making
process so that it resembles that of a well-trained trial judge. The pre-
sumption is that a jury that uses a legal analysis framework during its
deliberations will invariably arrive at a judicially acceptable verdict.
The hallmark of legal analysis, after all, is the prioritization of legal
issues within independent and dependent categories. 64 The resolution
of these claims depends on the application of neutral rules specific to
the legal issues according to their respective priority.65
Two reform innovations that employ this strategy are the use of bi-
furcated trials and special verdicts.66 Both techniques parse the fac-
tual and legal issues from a single cause of action into logical segments
(e.g., liability, compensatory damages, punitive damages).67 In bifur-
cated trials, only the evidence and testimony relevant to each segment
is presented to the jury for its decision before moving forward to the
next segment, if necessary.68 Special verdicts, in contrast, do not af-
fect the evidentiary presentation at trial, but instead require jurors to
articulate answers to specific questions concerning disputed facts in
the case and the jury's application of law to those facts.69 The use of
these techniques raises a number of concerns about their impact on
the jury and on jury verdicts. The two most prevalent concerns are
whether bifurcation and special verdicts actually improve the quality
of jury decision making70 (as evidenced by the verdict) and whether
64. See generally KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION
To LEGAL REASONING 39-55 (1996) (describing the process of synthesizing law).
65. Id. at 65-106 (describing the process of applying law to facts).
66. See NATIONAL CrR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 48, at 112-16, 187-90. Typically, both
techniques are reserved for cases involving complex evidentiary issues or applicable law. Id.
67. Id. at 112, 187.
68. FED. R. CIv. P. 42(b).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
70. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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they prevent the jury from bringing community values into their delib-
erations or reflecting such values in their verdicts. 71
The first concern is entirely pragmatic: Is it feasible to structure the
trial or deliberative process in such a way that jury comprehension of
factual and legal issues will be equivalent to that of judges? 72 Will the
use of such techniques make jury verdicts as predictable or as reliable
as judges' verdicts? Empirical studies suggest that the use of bifur-
cated trials and special verdicts can improve overall juror comprehen-
sion or provide a practical roadmap for jurors during their
deliberations, respectively. 73
There is no question, however, that these techniques artificially con-
strain juror decision making either by withholding selected portions of
evidence until the jury returns its verdict on a specific element of the
claim or by forcing the jury's deliberations to conform to the format
articulated in the special verdict questions. These constraints are pre-
cisely what raise the second concern-that they remove the ability of
juries to inject community values into their deliberations, thus under-
mining one of the traditional justifications for civil jury trials.74 A bet-
ter alternative, claim opponents of such reforms, is to modify trial
procedures in such a way that jurors use their natural learning and
decision making abilities to comprehend the evidence and apply the
law more effectively. 75
71. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
72. See Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects of
Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 297; David A. Lombardero, Do
Special Verdicts Improve the Structure of Jury Decision-Making?, 36 JURIMETRICS 275 (1996).
73. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Steven J. Breckler, Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury
Decision Making, 14 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1990) (discussing the relative advantages and
disadvantages of special verdicts in light of a study of their impact on juror decision making).
74. See Jennifer M. Granholm & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting
Devices Defeat the Jury's Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505 (1995); Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifur-
cation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14
VAND. L. REV. 831, 832-35 (1961); see also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (discussing
some traditional justifications for civil jury trials). Of course, some critics of the civil jury argue
that "community values" already play too great a part in jury deliberations-leading to unwar-
ranted plaintiff verdicts and excessive damages on "deep pocket" defendants. For a summary of
the critics' arguments, see NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY:
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS
DAMAGE AWARDS (1995); Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business
Litigation, 79 JUDICATURE 242 (1996); Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors'
Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 328-30 (1999); Robert J. MacCoun,
Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the "Deep Pockets"
Hypothesis, 30 L. & Soc'Y REV. 121 (1996). Recent research on bifurcation, however, reveals
that the effects of this technique may be more complex than previously realized. See Landsman
et al., supra note 72, at 316-33.
75. See, e.g., B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights:" Creating Educated
and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229 (1993).
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C. Making Trials Juror-Friendly
A host of jury trial innovations are consistent with the "educational
model" of jury reform. They include such reforms as preinstructing
the jury about the applicable law,76 and permitting jurors to take
notes 77 and to submit questions through the trial judge to witnesses. 78
These techniques, now a routine practice in many courts, are based on
the premise that providing jurors with a conceptual framework in
which to evaluate the evidence and permitting them to use the tools
that they would normally employ in a new learning situation increase
juror comprehension, recall, and satisfaction.79
Other reforms are less widely employed, but nevertheless are gain-
ing favorable attention in many jurisdictions. For example, permitting
civil jurors to discuss the evidence before final deliberations purport-
edly allows jurors an opportunity to clarify ambiguous evidence or tes-
timony while it is still fresh in their minds. 80 In cases where the jury
deadlocks over an evidentiary issue, reopening the case for additional
argument or evidence is thought to be less potentially coercive than
the standard Allen charge 8' and a reasonable alternative to declaring a
mistrial.82 Written copies of well-organized, "plain English" jury in-
structions are also a popular component of contemporary jury reform,
because poorly drafted jury instructions are known to be one of the
greatest impediments to juror comprehension.83
76. Vicki L. Smith, The Feasibility and Utility of Pretrial Instruction in the Substantive Law, 14
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 235, 236 (1990).
77. AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'y, TOWARD MORE ACrIVE JURIES: TAKING NOTES AND
ASKING QUESTIONS 8-10, 13-14, 16-17 (1991); David L. Rosenhan et al., Notetaking Can Aid
Juror Recall, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1994).
78. AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'y, supra note 77, at 7, 11-13, 15-16.
79. See Vicki L. Smith, How Jurors Make Decisions: The Value of Trial Innovations, in NA-
TIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 48, at 5-21.
80. Hannaford et al., supra note 1; Valerie P. Hans et al., The Arizona Jury Reform Permitting
Civil Jury Trial Discussions: The Views of Trial Participants, Judges, and Jurors, 32 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM (forthcoming 1999). Although several states are considering this reform, only Arizona
has implemented this reform by court rule. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 39(f). The Juror Discussions Pro-
ject, supra note 8, is an independent evaluation of this reform. The results of the study will be
available in late 1998.
81. The "Allen charge" or "dynamite charge" is a jury instruction often delivered to dead-
locked juries. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). The instruction asks jurors to "listen,
with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments" and specifically suggests to jurors
holding the minority position in deliberations to "consider whether his doubt was a reasonable
one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelli-
gent with himself." Id. at 501.
82. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 39(h); see Dann, supra note 75, at 1269-77.
83. Although most judges are willing to provide jurors with written instructions, few have
taken substantial steps toward drafting "plain English" jury instructions, ostensibly because of
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Despite considerable enthusiasm in some quarters, many of these
reform techniques present difficult and troubling questions about their
effectiveness and their ultimate impact on civil jury verdicts.
Although many jurors are enthusiastic about the opportunity to take a
more active role in the trial process, not all of them take advantage of
these opportunities. For example, some jurors take only sketchy notes
(if any), despite receiving permission (and even notepads and writing
utensils) from the court to do So. 8 4 In the evaluation of Arizona Rule
39(f), permitting jurors in civil cases to discuss the evidence before
final deliberations, nearly one-third of the jurors did not engage in
such discussions.85
The reality that empirical research is often inconclusive about the
overall effectiveness of these types of reforms complicates the picture.
A study of the effect of permitting jurors to take notes and ask ques-
tions, for example, did not prove conclusively that such techniques
significantly improve juror comprehension or recall of the evidence.8 6
Other studies of innovative techniques have shown contradictory, in-
conclusive, or only marginal results.8 7 In fact, the only reform that
consistently improves juror comprehension is to simplify and clarify
jury instructions-a labor-intensive task that many judges are reluc-
tant to undertake because of fear of deviating from pattern instruc-
tions that have already survived appellate scrutiny.88
Finally, some judges (and attorneys) are suspicious that these types
of jury reform techniques cross the line between an educational model
of jury decision making and a "pop psychology" or mass marketing
approach to trial practice. 89 Many people who hold the image of care-
the perceived risk that instructions that deviate from well-established pattern instructions will
not survive appellate scrutiny. Munsterman & Hannaford, supra note 50, at 9.
84. Although an instruction explaining that jurors are permitted to take notes is required in
Arizona, ARIz. R. Ov. P. 39(p), an evaluation of the Arizona jury reforms found that 11% of
jurors reported taking only sketchy notes and 4% did not take any notes at all. Juror Discus-
sions Project, supra note 8.
85. In the evaluation of the Arizona civil rule that permits jurors to discuss the evidence
before final deliberations, 20% expressed concern that doing so would compromise their ability
to make an independent judgment about the evidence. Juror Discussions Project, supra note 8.
86. AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'y, supra note 77, at 11. It did, however, disprove allegations
that these techniques would distract jurors or otherwise jeopardize the neutral role of the jury.
Id.
87. Compare David L. Rosenhan et al., supra note 77, at 59-60 (finding that those who took
notes during a trial simulation showed superior recall and involvement proportionate to the
quantity, accuracy, and organization of notes taken) with AMERICAN JUDICATURE Soc'v, supra
note 77, at 11-14 (reporting few benefits in either juror question asking or note taking).
88. Munsterman & Hannaford, supra note 50, at 9.
89. See, e.g., Noelle C. Nelson, A New Generation of Jurors?, TRIAL, July 1997, at 54 (describ-
ing techniques designed to appeal to "Generation X" jurors).
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ful, thoughtful, sober jurors as the ideal find it troublesome to think
that courtroom "gimmicks" (e.g., demonstrative evidence, technologi-
cal presentations of evidence) can significantly affect jury decision
making or influence the jury's verdict.
CONCLUSION
As has been discussed, the factors that determine judges' opinions
about civil juries are far more complex than simply whether the judges
generally agree or disagree with jury verdicts-or even approve of ju-
rors' approach to decision making. Some judges tend to view the civil
jury as a natural partner that makes the difficult factual determina-
tions, leaving the judge free to concentrate on the managerial and ad-
ministrative aspects of the trial and other pending cases. Other judges
view the civil jury in a more negative light-for example, as a compar-
atively less effective and efficient method of dispute resolution than a
bench trial or even as a sign of the judge's failure to resolve the case
during pretrial discovery. Indeed, each judge's views can vary from
trial to trial depending on the characteristics of the trial, the efforts
expended to resolve the case, and the external pressure on the judge
to resolve the existing caseload. Finally, judges' use of contemporary
jury reform techniques-and in particular their choice of reforms-
also reflects judges' views of the civil jury. The fact that judges some-
times use different types of reform techniques in combinations that do
not necessarily serve the same ends may reveal misunderstanding by
some judges about the impact of these techniques and highlights the
need for more information.
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